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Several experimental studies on altruism have found women to be more generous than men. 
We investigate whether observed gender gaps in generosity can be explained by experimental 
setting, where some settings are more conducive than others to activating gender identity and 
social norms. In a dictator game we study priming along two dimensions: 1) some subjects 
enter their gender on the first page of the questionnaire (Pre) while others enter their gender 
on the last page (Post) and 2) some subjects are seated in single-sex rooms (Homogeneous) 
while others are seated in gender-mixed rooms (Mixed). It turns out that gender differences 
occur (women are more generous than men) only for the combination Pre and Mixed. The 
effect is driven by males: men are sensitive to priming, while women are not. 
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There is a notion, originating with French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir, that the 
difference between men and women is only a social construct. Be that as it may; we all agree 
that there are stereotypes: women are expected to behave differently than men in certain 
situations. Such stereotypes can be powerful. They may even affect our own behavior so as to 
make us conform to social expectations. Behavioral differences between men and women 
have been observed in a number of economic experiments.
1 In this paper, we suggest that at 
least some of these gender differences are the result of the experimental context. As our 
vehicle of investigation we have used the dictator game, which is a game that involves 
altruistic behavior. There are clear gender stereotypes that might guide such behavior: people 
expect men to be relatively more egoistic and women more generous. Our aim is to study 
whether, and to what extent, gender differences in dictator-game behavior can be attributed to 
the experimental setting. 
      We  know  from  social  psychology  that the design of an experiment affects the way 
subjects think of themselves, and may induce subjects to behave according to stereotypes by, 
for instance, the use of priming.
2 In a famous study, Steele and Aronson (1995) showed that 
self-perceived expectations affected subjects’ academic performance: if they were not 
reminded of their race, black and white students performed equally well in a math test, 
whereas if they were reminded, blacks performed significantly worse than whites.
3 According 
to the theory of self-categorization within social psychology, this particular type of priming 
                                                 
1 See Eckel and Grossman (2008b) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) for recent overviews of the experimental 
literature on gender-specific behavior. 
2 Priming means that certain associations are activated in the mind just before a task is to be undertaken, It can, 
be achieved, for example, by letting subjects complete sentences with words related to ageing and consequently 
observing their walking speed (Bargh et al., 1996), looking at photos of black and white people and thereafter 
asking them to indicate whether adjectives are “good” or “bad” (Fazio et al., 1995) or even by subliminal 
methods (Strahan et al., 2002). 
3 Similar effects of priming concern women and math performance; see, for instance, Brown and Josephs (1999), 
Spencer et al. (1999) and McGlone and Aronson (2006).  
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activates a “social identity” which regulates behavior.
4 The activation of a social identity can 
be seen as the self-imposed internalization of a social norm – a process called self-
stereotyping. In this sphere, different social identities can co-exist. Self-categorization theory 
also suggests that gender priming may interact with other aspects of context. Guimond et al. 
(2006) find that stereotypes lead to behavioral differences in social contexts where subjects 
see themselves as part of a group, rather than as individuals. Such dependency on context 
implies that the self-induced gender differences are unstable and can be manipulated 
experimentally. 
      In economics, the effects of identity have aroused increasing interest. Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000) introduced identity in an economic model of behavior where identity or self-image 
enters into the utility function.
5  Here, individual utility is affected by the degree of adherence 
to a social norm, and behaving according to the norm strengthens an individual’s identity. We 
use this theoretical framework to structure our experiment and, specifically we examine 
gender social norms in connection with generous or altruistic behavior. 
      In  the  experimental  economics  literature,  the  role  of  priming has not been studied 
systematically.
6  Gender priming means gently reminding the subjects of their gender before 
playing, e.g., a dictator game. Our point of departure is that gender priming may entice men 
and women to act in accordance with some perceived norms of behavior, even if there are no 
inherent differences between men and women in this context. Such gender stereotypes are 
expectations or beliefs about differences in character traits between men and women and are 
                                                 
4 Some key references in social identity theory and self-categorization theory are Tajfel and Turner (1979), 
Turner (1982), Hogg and Abrams (1988) and Turner and Onorato (1999). For an overview of the concept of 
“identity” in the social psychology literature, see the textbook by Hogg and Vaughan (2008, chapters 4 and 11). 
5 See also Akerlof and Kranton (2005, 2008), Antecol and Cobb-Clark (2008), and Ben-Ner et al. (2008). 
6 There is, however, a growing number of new studies, such as Ahmed (2008) on religious priming, Rigdon et al. 
(2008) on priming involving a picture with “watching eyes”, Eckel et al. (2007) on priming in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina; and Benjamin et al (2008); see also Gilad and Kliger (2008), Meier-Pesti and Penz (2008) on 
priming and risk preferences. 
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well known in the social psychology literature: women are expected to be docile and 
generous, while men are expected to be confident and self-assertive (see Bakan, 1966, 
Williams and Best, 1982, and Myers, 2008). Expectations consistent with these gender norms 
have also been identified in dictator experiments (see Aguiar et al., 2009, and Eckel and 
Grossman, 2002).   
     Since Kahneman et al. (1986) and Forsythe et al. (1994), the dictator game has been a 
standard tool in experimental economics. While many researchers have claimed that behavior 
in laboratory experiments with the dictator game could be used to draw general conclusions 
about prosocial behavior, this view has recently been challenged by, for instance, List (2007) 
and Levitt and List (2007). One aspect of this criticism of the external validity of lab 
experiments is that “context matters” and that the way the experiment tasks are presented, 
combined with the personal expectations and references that subjects bring into the 
experiment, may affect behavior. For instance, subjects who play the dictator game may part 
with money to some extent because they feel that they are expected to so do in a particular 
experimental context.
7 Our experiment explores the importance of context in some detail for 
the case of gender-specific expectations of egoism and generosity. 
     Among  the  large  number  of  dictator-game studies, several have dealt with gender 
differences. The results are ambiguous, however. Bolton and Katok (1995) found no gender 
effects in the dictator game. But Eckel and Grossman (1998) found that women donate twice 
as much as men. This result conforms to the conventional wisdom that women are more 
generous than men. In terms of experimental setting, it may be noted that Eckel and 
Grossman (1998) seated their subjects in single-sex rooms. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) 
studied dictator games with different prices of giving. They found no gender differences when 
                                                 
7 Similar conclusions, i.e. that prosocial behavior may partly be the result of social norms in a particular context, 
are reached by Bardsley (2008), Dana et al. (2006), and Koch and Normann (2008). 
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the price of giving was unity, but did find gender differences at other prices. A few other 
studies have found gender differences under different experimental settings, while others have 
found no significant differences; for an overview of the literature, see Table 1. None of the 
previous studies on gender effects in the dictator game considered priming.  
 
  (Table  1) 
 
      In the experiment reported in this paper, we primed some of the participants in the sense 
of gently reminding them of their gender before they played the game (the priming condition). 
Our hypothesis, based on self-categorization theory, is that such priming only activates the 
gender identity of those subjects who are seated with individuals of the other sex (the mixed-
gender condition) but not for those subjects that are seated in single-sex rooms. It turned out 
that sizeable gender differences appeared when primed subjects were seated together in 
gender-mixed rooms. In this setting, men were significantly and considerably less generous 
than women. Gender effects were less pronounced in single-sex settings, with one exception: 
men turned out to be more generous than women when the price of donations was low. When 
we compared behavior under different treatments, we found that the men changed their 
behavior depending on the combination of priming and seating conditions, while women 
turned out to be quite insensitive to types of treatment.  
      Below, we begin by presenting our theoretical predictions and the experiment. We then 
report on our results on gender difference effects (on average and distribution-wise) in each of 
the priming configurations for the case when the price of giving was equal to one. Next, we 
investigate what happened when the price of transferring money was allowed to vary. We 
then look at subjects’ expectations about the recipient, and examine treatment effects for men 
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and women. A penultimate section discusses how our findings relate to observer gender 
differences in the experimental literature (mainly in risk aversion), followed by a conclusion. 
 
2. Theory and predictions 
We adapt the utility function proposed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) to a dictator-game 
decision and formulate the following utility function: 
 
) , , ( j j j j j I u U − = π π . 
 
Individual utility depends on the own payoff  j π , and the amount given to the other player(s) 
j − π  . The term   is “identity deviation”, i.e., the extent to which the individual deviates from 
what she perceives as expected of her. We postulate that   is increasing in the first two 
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where   is what individual j perceives as the norm associated with her gender identity. 
For instance, if j is a woman, 
) ( j gender G
female j gender G G = ) (  and might take the form “act generously” – 
while for a man,   might take the form “act egoistically”. A deviation from the 
norm will then affect the individual’s utility   negatively. We assume a norm sensitivity,  , 
which is zero if the norm is not activated and unity if it is. The gender norm   
prescribes the amount to be given to the other, and non-adherence imposes a loss if and only 
if the norm is activated. The norm is gender-specific and smaller for men than for women: 
male j gender G G = ) (
j U s
) ( j gender G
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female male G G < . For men, minimizing loss of identity implies donating a smaller amount to the 
recipient, compared with women’s loss-minimizing behavior. The magnitude of the 
individual’s reaction to norm activation depends on the utility function  , i.e., different 
individuals can be affected differently which, in turn, would cause variation in how much 
individuals adapt their behavior. In summary, gender enters utility indirectly through the 
gender norm only when the sense of gender identity is triggered. 
j u
      The  question  now  is  under  which  circumstances the gender identity is activated. We 
propose that two conditions need to be satisfied for this to occur: subjects have to be reminded 
of their gender (the priming condition) and subjects have to be in the presence of individuals 
of the other sex (the gender-mixed group condition). We now turn to the implementation of 
these conditions in the experiment. 
     Our priming condition concerns the formulation of experiment instructions. Some subjects 
were asked to enter their gender on the first page of the questionnaire in which they record 
their decisions in the experiment, i.e., before playing the dictator game. This group is labeled 
Pre. Others were asked to enter their gender on the last page of the questionnaire, i.e., after 
playing the dictator game. This group is labeled Post. The purpose of the Pre treatment is to 
remind subjects of their gender and thereby indirectly of the gender norm, which is easily 
interpreted in a dictator game: men should be egoistic and women generous.  
      Our gender-mixed group condition concerns the gender composition in the room where 
the experiment takes place. The subjects were seated either in single-sex rooms 
(Homogeneous), or in gender-mixed rooms (Mixed). It might be argued that people become 
more aware of their own sex when seated in a room with many attractive representatives of 
the opposite sex. This, in fact, is what follows from self-categorization theory – see, for 
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example, Onorato and Turner (2004) who find that gender norms prevail less strongly in a 
single-sex environment.
8 
      Our experimental set-up combines the priming condition in the experimental instructions 
(Post vs. Pre), with the gender-mixed group condition (Mixed vs. Homogeneous), to achieve 
four configurations of gender priming: Mixed Post,  Mixed Pre,  Homogeneous Post and 
Homogeneous Pre. We are now ready to formulate our expected empirical observations with 
respect to our different treatments:  
 
Proposition 1: We expect to find larger gender differences in generosity when the Pre and 
Mixed treatments are combined. In the Mixed Pre treatment, women donate more than men. 
 
      Our hypotheses about gender differences in the four treatments are summarized in Table 
2, where we have sharpened the hypothesis from Proposition 1 to say that we not only expect 
weaker gender differences in the Homogoenous treatment, but even zero differences. 
 
  (Table  2) 
   
3. The experiment 
Four consecutive classes of law students at Stockholm University played the dictator game in 
2007, 2008 and 2009.
9 The experiments were introduced straightforwardly during a lecture on 
                                                 
8 Alternatively it might be hypothesized that subjects are more primed – i.e., more aware of their own gender – 
when they are seated in a room with others of the same gender. According to social psychology, however, the 
Eckel and Grossman (1998) arrangement with men and women in different rooms is less likely to activate gender 
norms. As noted above, Eckel and Grossman found women to be significantly more generous than men. 
9 During the experiment, which lasted for one half-hour, the students played three prisoner’s dilemma games and 
three dictator games. In the present paper we deal only with the latter. 
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negotiations and game theory. The students had not been introduced to concepts such as 
optimal strategies, Nash equilibrium, etc. prior to the experiment.  
     In all of these dictator games, each subject was told that she had 500 Swedish crowns 
(approximately 65 US dollars) at her disposal and that she could anonymously donate part of 
this amount to an anonymous, randomly chosen fellow student in the class, and keep the rest 
for herself. According to the mainstream economics notion of a rational “economic man”, all 
participants would keep the whole amount and donate nothing. Dictator-game subjects in 
general do not keep everything for themselves – in fact, a majority of subjects give something 
and, on average, about 20 percent is given away (see Camerer, 2003, chapter 2).  
      It was made clear to all participants that they were anonymous. Subjects were identifiable 
to the experimenters only by a lottery number, and dictators and recipients were anonymous 
vis-à-vis one another. Subjects were seated spaciously in the lecture halls, so nobody could 
see what the neighbors chose to answer. The stakes were real, but for practical reasons only 
20 percent of the subjects actually received what they had gained. Those winners were drawn 
randomly. The maximum gain was 1000 Swedish crowns (USD 130) and the average 
payment for the 20 percent who were actually paid was 318 Swedish crowns (USD 42). Since 
real money was involved, the Swedish tax authorities had to know the identities of those who 
were actually paid; payment of the money to each winner was handled by an administrator 
who was otherwise not involved in the experiment. 
      As in most experiments of this type, we used students at our own university as subjects. 
Thus, our results are subject to the reservation that students are not necessarily representative 
of the country’s population as a whole. Even among students there is a selection problem, 
since those who actively volunteer to participate are not necessarily representative of the 
student body as a whole. We were able to avoid the latter problem by performing the 
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experiment as part of a law school program. Although the students were told that participation 
was voluntary, the experiment formed a natural part of the required economics course they 
were taking. In fact, only a handful declined to participate. 
      The actual experiment was carried out in the following way. Each subject received a 
questionnaire with a page stating the general conditions of the game (“you are given 500 
crowns and may give away part of this amount to an anonymous, randomly chosen fellow 
student in the class”) and showing eleven alternative donations (0, 50, 100, 150, …, 450, 
500). The subject was asked to choose one of these donations. On the next page the question 
was then repeated but any amount transferred was divided by two before it reached the 
recipient, i.e., the price of giving was equal to two. On a third page the question was again 
repeated but the price of giving was one-half, i.e., amounts donated were doubled. After 
having answered the questions about donations, subjects in the Post group were asked to turn 
the page and answer three supplementary questions: age, gender and the number of terms 
studied at university. For the Pre group, however, the question about gender was on the first 
page and only the questions about age and the number of terms studied was on the last page.
10 
      The  allocations  of  subjects over the four configurations (Mixed Post,  Mixed Pre, 
Homogeneous Post and Homogeneous Pre) are shown in Table 3. 
 
  Table  3. 
 
4. Main findings 
In Appendix 1, we provide the raw data of the experiment for each of the three prices of 
giving (i.e., p = 1, p = 2, and p = ½). Here, we present an analysis of the raw data for the case 
                                                 
10 A translation of the instructions may be found in Appendix 2. 
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where the price of giving is equal to one, i.e., the recipient gets exactly the amount given to 
her by the dictator. In all presentations of the results, the maximum donation has been 
normalized to 100; this also means that results can be interpreted as donations in percent of 
the maximum donation.
11 The discussion of our main findings starts with the question of 
whether there is a gender difference in central moments (means and medians), and proceeds to 
consider gender differences in the general distributions. It ends by examining how priming 
affects the prevalence of male and female egoists and egalitarians. 
4.1 Gender differences by means and medians 
Table 4 reports the means and medians of the amount given (in percent of 500 Swedish 
crowns) by men and women, respectively, in each of the four treatment groups. The table also 
shows the results of t tests and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) tests for gender effects 
within each treatment group (in the right-hand column).
12 
 
  Table  4. 
 
     In the Mixed Post treatment men are more generous than women, which is in contrast with 
the gender stereotype as well as with the most commonly reported gender difference. The 
difference is not statistically significant under a two-sided t test or WMW test. However, if 
we consider the one-sided hypothesis that women are more generous than men, this can be 
rejected at the ten percent level (the P value = 0.0532 in the t test and 0.0862 in the WMW 
                                                 
11 This was done by dividing all donations by five. 
12 The t test is the standard parametric test which compares the means of two random samples from a normal 
distribution, while the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney uses ranks to test the hypothesis that the two samples are drawn 
from the same distribution without making assumptions about the form of that distribution. The WMW test is 
commonly used as a medians test, although this is strictly true only if the variances of the distributions from 
which the samples are taken are the same (see Siegel and Castellan, 1988, pp. 128-137). The alternative median 
test is less powerful than the WMW test (see Freidlin and Gastwirth, 2000).   
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test). In the Mixed Pre treatment the situation is reversed and women give almost twice as 
much as men do. This difference between men and women is strongly significant.
13 In the 
Homogeneous Post and Homogeneous Pre treatments there are no gender differences in 
donations. 
     Thus, we find strong support for our Proposition 1 when analyzing the first moment of the 
distribution.  
4.2 Gender differences by distributions 
The above discussion of data from the four treatments focused on differences in central 
tendency. More information about subject behavior can be gained from looking at 
distributions. Figure 1 shows histograms over the donations (in percent of 500) in each of the 
four treatments. The distributions of donations in Figure 1 are clearly bimodal in all four 
treatments. There seem to be two major personality types in our data: those who give nothing 
(egoists) and those who give away half (egalitarians). In all four treatments a majority of the 
subjects belong to either of these categories.
14 This is much in line with the findings in 
Andreoni and Miller (2002), who identify about 75 percent of their subjects in a dictator game 
as either selfish or having Leontief preferences. A glance at Figure 1 is enough to detect that 
there are only minor differences across panels a, c and d, while panel b (Mixed Pre) looks 
different. While in the other three panels there are roughly as many egoists as egalitarians 
among both men and women, when men are primed in a gender-mixed seating almost 60 
percent become egoists and only 10 percent egalitarians.  
 
                                                 
13 Tests are two-sided unless otherwise noted. 
14 In Mixed Post this is true for 73 percent of the men and 64 percent of the women, in Mixed Pre for 70 percent 
of the men and 72 percent of the women, in Homogeneous Post for 77 percent of the men and 68 percent of the 
women, and in Homogeneous Pre for 76 percent of the men and 73 percent of the women. 
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  Figure  1. 
 
Again, this appears to be consistent with Proposition 1, but requires formal testing.  To check 
this we compare the distributions using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Epps-Singleton 
test.
15 Table 5 shows the P values in tests for gender effects. The tests point in the same 
direction as our previous results, namely that a gender difference arises in Mixed Pre. The 
Epps-Singleton test also detects a gender difference in Mixed Post, where women donate on 
average less than men (see Table 4). 
 
  Table  5. 
 
          As one might expect, Figure 1 indicates that within a gender, all individuals are not 
similar. The categories we call “men” and “women” may actually consist of several 
groups/types with different personality traits. What we perceive as “gender differences” could 
then simply be different proportions of these personality traits within each gender. Since such 
a large proportion of the subjects act as either egoists or egalitarians, we might expect our 
results on gender differences to be evident also if we study only egoists and egalitarians.  
4.3 Gender differences by egoists and egalitarians 
We now define two personalities as follows. An “egoist” gives away zero; an “egalitarian” 
gives away half the money. The proportions of egoists and egalitarians among men and 
women in each of the treatments are shown in Table 6, along with P values for tests for 
                                                 
15 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is sensitive to differences in location and skewness, as well as central tendency. 
It is a non-parametric test based on the largest of the observed deviations between the cumulative distribution 
functions for the two samples (see Siegel and Castellan, 1988, pp. 144-151). The Epps-Singleton test is based on 
the empirical characteristic function (see Epps, 1993). Forsythe et al. (1994) found this test more powerful than 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test in simulations based on dictator and ultimatum games. 
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gender effects.
16 These results are in accordance with our hypotheses. In Mixed Post there is 
no gender difference in the proportion of egoists or egalitarians, while in Mixed Pre there is a 
significant gender difference: a larger proportion of men are egoists and a larger proportion of 
women are egalitarians. In Homogeneous Post and in Homogeneous Pre there are no gender 
differences in the proportions of egoists or egalitarians.  
 
  Table  6. 
 
      The tendency for a large proportion of subjects to choose either the egoistic (“keep all”) or 
the egalitarian (“fair split”) behavior is very general in dictator games. Of these, it is 
egalitarian behavior that seems the more puzzling. In a recent paper, Andreoni and Bernheim 
(2009) investigate egalitarian behavior and explain the fact that it is so common in these 
games as the result of a desire to be perceived as fair by others, even among subjects who do 
not have strong preferences for fairness per se. In terms of our theoretical framework with 
identity and gender norm adherence, a parallel effect could be that people like to perceive 
themselves as fair, and that the gender norm, when it is activated, introduces a gender 
difference in this respect. 
 
5. Prices and gender effects 
So far we have analyzed the economic decisions of men and women when the price of giving 
has been unity, that is, the recipient gets exactly the amount given by the donator. Other 
studies, however, have found that the price of altruism matters for how much people give; see, 
for instance, Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman et al. (2005). In particular, Andreoni and 
                                                 
16 We use a two-sided test for equality of proportions (the prtest in Stata). 
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Vesterlund (2001) show that men and women react differently to prices: while men tend to be 
more altruistic than women when it is cheap to give, women tend to be more altruistic than 
men when it is expensive to give. However, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) do not address 
the possibility of context effects.  
5.1 Prices and gender effects by means and medians 
    Self-categorization theory (as described in the Introduction) implies that we should expect 
gender differences in altruism to be strongest in the Mixed Pre-treatment, but says nothing 
about price effects. A priori, it is not possible to know whether the price effect or the 
treatment effect will dominate. Table 7 states the expected effects according to the two 
different strands of literature. As in Table 2, we have exaggerated the importance of 
treatments by hypothesizing that the gender effects exist when the two strands of literature say 
they are strong, and that the effects are zero when the literature says they are weaker. 
 
  Table  7. 
 
Interestingly enough, there is only one case, namely in Mixed Pre with the price of giving 
equal to one-half (cell B1), where self-categorization theory (SCT) and Andreoni and 
Vesterlund (2001) yield opposite predictions. In the remaining cases they have either the same 
predictions (as in A2, B3, C2 and D2) or one strand of literature predicts gender inequalities 
in altruism while the other does not.  
      The raw data for different prices are given in Appendix 1. Let us now see whether there 
are any gender differences in means and medians when the price is equal to ½ and 2, 
respectively. In Table 8 we report the gender effects for each treatment The picture is 
somewhat different from what we found in the case when the price of giving is equal to one – 
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see Table 4. When it is inexpensive to give (p = ½) we find just one gender effect: men are 
more generous than women in the Homogeneous Pre-treatment. When it is expensive to give 
(p = 2), women are significantly more generous than men in the Mixed Pre-treatment (and 
also in the Homogeneous Post according to the WMW test). When p = ½ we also note that 
although there is a statistically significant gender difference only in Homogeneous Pre, men 
are more generous than women in three out of four treatments (we return to this below). 
 
  Table  8. 
 
      We summarize our findings from Tables 4 and 8 in Table 9, where we also state the 
existing hypotheses (understood as the unweighted sum of predictions from Andreoni and 
Vesterlund, 2001, and self-categorization theory). Our results are to a surprising extent in line 
with the hypothesized implications. This suggests that it is not sufficient to consider only the 
price or the treatment dimension when attempting to understand gender differences in 
altruism. In particular, taking only the price dimension into account would have made it 
difficult to understand the absence of gender differences in B1 (i.e., when it is inexpensive to 
give in Mixed Pre), and it would have been equally difficult to rationalize the presence of a 
significant gender difference in B2 (when p = 1). On the other hand, considering only SCT 
predictions would not have explained why we find the tendency of men to be more altruistic 
when it is cheap to give, while they give less than women when it is expensive to be altruistic.  
 
  Table  9. 
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5.2. Summing up the effects of gender and prices  
According to our results above on gender differences in the four treatments price by price, it 
is clear that gender differences vary with price. The next step is to analyze the impacts of 
gender and price jointly, so as to separate any systematic effects. Table 10 reports the results 
of five regressions where the dependent variable is the (percentage) amount donated 
(regressions (i), (ii) and (iii)), the proportion of egoists (iv), and egalitarians (v), respectively. 
 
  Table  10. 
 
     As  expected,  gender  in  itself  does  not explain the amount given, nor do any of the 
treatments. But the interaction of being a man in a mixed-gender seating and having indicated 
one’s gender before playing the game (Mixed Pre * Men) is strongly significant, and implies 
that men give significantly less (14 percentage points less) than women in the same treatment. 
We see that a low price of altruism increases donations, and even more so for men, which is 
in line with Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001). This is also clear from Table 8, i.e., men are 
particularly generous when the price of giving is low. A high price reduces average donations, 
but in this instance the gender effect is not significant.  
    We conclude that the gender effects that are evident when the price of giving is equal to 
one are robust when we control for the price of giving. Thus a stable gender difference is 
found in Mixed Pre but not in the other treatments. In Mixed Pre men are more egoistic than 
women as expected from Proposition 1. 
 
  16 
6. Subject expectations and gender 
We now investigate some potentially confounding factors regarding subjects’ beliefs about 
the gender of the recipient. We also consider whether the stereotypes about male and female 
behavior are explicitly shared by our subjects. To do this we formulated an additional 
treatment: subjects in some of the Homogeneous Post sessions were informed that the 
recipient of their donation would be a randomly chosen and anonymous person in the same 
room, instead of someone in the full group of students as in the standard formulation. We also 
asked a subset of the subjects some questions about whether they would prefer a man or a 
woman as recipient (if they were dictators), and whether they would prefer a man or a woman 
as dictator (if they were recipients).  
6.1 Recipient effects 
In our experiment, the recipient of the dictator’s choice has – independently of treatment – 
explicitly been a randomly selected fellow student attending the same course; see Appendix 2. 
Even so, it is conceivable that subjects seated with persons of the same sex (in the 
Homogeneous condition) might expect the recipient to be in the same room, i.e., that he or she 
is of the same sex. To control for this possibility we let 57 subjects in the Homogeneous Post-
treatment explicitly have a same-sex recipient seated in their room. Table 11 compares the 
amounts given by subjects with a same-sex recipient as opposed to those having a recipient of 
random sex. 
 
  Table  11. 
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      There are no significant differences in donations either between genders or within each 
gender with respect to different types of recipients. The absence of a recipient effect is in 
contrast to some previous studies where both men and women were found to be more 
generous towards women – see Dufwenberg and Muren (2006), Saad and Gill (2001) and 
Eckel and Grossman (2001).  This suggests that the gender of the recipient does not matter in 
our particular context. (Alternatively, it might be that our dictators in the Homogeneous 
condition always feel, although incorrectly, that their recipient is of their own sex.) 
      The irrelevance of the recipient's gender may well reflect a more general gender neutrality 
in preferences over the recipient. This is supported by the observation that when asked to 
indicate their preference over the gender of the recipient in an additional question, 
approximately 70 percent of the subjects indicated that they were indifferent regarding the sex 
of the recipient, independently of type of treatment – see Table 12.
17 Our analysis of recipient 
effects thus does not suggest that subject expectations about or preferences over the gender of 
the recipient would be a confounding factor behind our results. 
 
  Table  12. 
 
6.2 Dictator gender and expectations 
A reason for choosing the dictator game to study gender priming is that the correspondence 
between choices in the game and well-documented stereotypes about male = 
competitive/egoistic, and female = kind/other-regarding seems very clear. A study by Aguiar 
et al. (2009) confirms this; their subjects expect female dictators to be more generous than 
                                                 
17 There appears to be a tendency for generosity towards women to increase in the Pre treatment; but the 
difference is not significant. 
  18 
male ones. We asked 132 subjects about their preference for the gender of the dictator. The 
results are presented in Table 13.  
 
  Table  13. 
 
     A majority of the subjects express indifference about the dictator’s gender, but most of 
those who do indicate a preference prefer a woman as dictator. When only considering those 
who express a preference over the gender of the dictator, men tend to choose male dictators to 
a much larger extent than women. This mimics the result in Aguiar et al. (2009) that  48.4 
percent of the men chose to be the recipients of a male dictator against only 26.3 percent of 
the women. (Note that Aguiar et al., 2009, do not allow for the possibility of respondents’ 
indifference about the sex of the dictator.)  
 
7. Decomposition by gender and treatment 
So far we have reported results on differences in generosity between male and female subjects 
in the four treatments. Our main result is that there is a gender difference in the Mixed Pre 
treatment – and that there, men are more egoistic than women. We now ask how this gender 
difference might emerge. We approach the question by running regressions on treatment 
effects for men and women. In doing so, we consider separately the priming condition (Pre as 
compared to Post) and the gender-mixed group condition (Homogeneous as compared to 
Mixed). The test results are shown in Table 14. 
 
  Table  14. 
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    Columns (i) and (iv) show significant differences between treatments only for men, and 
only for the Mixed Pre treatment. This treatment makes men less generous and reduces the 
average male donation by almost half (see also Table 3). The other treatments do not have 
significant effects on donations.  
      Columns (ii) and (iii) show the effects of the Homogeneous seating condition and the 
priming condition Pre on male donations, one at a time and without considering the four 
treatment categories. It turns out that, when taken on its own, Homogeneous has a significant 
positive effect on donations, while Pre when taken on its own has a significant negative 
effect. This suggests a slightly different interpretation of our results: priming may activate the 
gender norm of male egoism in both the Homogeneous and Mixed seating conditions, but is 
counteracted by Homogeneous, which indicates that men are more generous in a completely 
male environment. At this point we can only speculate about the origin of this effect. Could it 
reflect a situation where men completely relax and free themselves from social expectations in 
a setting where they are reminded of being men among men? They would then become more 
generous when liberating themselves from residual social norms.
18 Another interpretation 
could be that there is some confusion as to who is the recipient. Despite clear instructions, 
people in same-sexed rooms may have been convinced that the recipient is in the room, and 
thus of their own sex. In fact, some recent articles note an asymmetry between genders with 
respect to “in-group love”.
19 Men are found to be more generous towards group-members 
                                                 
18 The observation that men tend to become more generous than women in single-sex settings is not new; 
Rapoport and Chammah (1965) have already found this pattern in prisoner's dilemma games. Likewise, Brown-
Kruse and Hummels (1993) find that men contribute more than women in single-sex groups in a public good 
provision game, although this result was later questioned by Nowell and Tinkler (1994). 
19 See, for example, Yamagishi and Mifune (2009) and Halevy, Bornstein and Sagiv (2008) who examine “in-
group love” in relation to “out-group hate” and competition among groups. 
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than women, which in our case could be translated into men becoming more altruistic when 
reminded that they are actually in such a setting. 
      Table 14 also shows that women give similar amounts in all treatments, thereby implying 
that being reminded of their sex does not seem to affect women’s egoism or altruism. The 
gender difference in Mixed Pre is caused by men changing their behavior due to gender 
priming. Thus our results suggest that men are more sensitive to priming than women. Some 
other papers also point in this direction: Meier (2006) studies how information about the 
behavior of others affects voluntary contributions, and finds that men react more strongly to 
such information than women do; Rigdon et al. (2008) show men to be more responsive than 
women to social cues; and Croson et al. (2008) study charitable giving in both the field and 
the lab, and find that only men react to temporarily created social norms. The overview of 
experimental gender differences by Croson and Gneezy (2009), however, argues that women 
are more  sensitive than men to variations in context. Our (and others’) observation that men 
but not women are sensitive to priming suggests that Simone de Beauvoir’s notion of the 
female gender as the constructed one should be revised. While she claimed that “One is not 
born a woman, but becomes one”, our data rather suggests that “One is not born a man, but 
becomes one”. More research is needed to shed light on this issue. 
 
8. Gender in experiments 
Our experiment shows that gender identity can be activated quite easily, and that it leads to 
gender-stereotypical behavior in a dictator game. Our work thus adds to the literature on 
gender differences in altruism. However, experimental data based on the decisions of men and 
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women are used to address many issues besides altruism, and our results therefore also have 
implications for experimental methodology. 
      In most experimental studies, the aim is not to study gender social identity and its effects, 
but rather how (non-primed) individuals act and react in a specific experimental decision 
situation. Our research suggests that when designing experiments, we may have to pay 
explicit attention to how gender should be handled, in order to avoid the activation of gender 
social identity. Otherwise, when we aim at analyzing deep gender differences in experiments, 
we may be capturing behavior emanating from a gender social identity, rather than the “true” 
behavior of an individual man or woman. 
      Our results question the existence of deep gender differences in pro-social behavior and 
preferences – at least as far as these are reflected in the dictator game. A vast literature in 
experimental economics has investigated and sometimes identified gender differences in other 
kinds of behavior. One might question whether, and to what extent, these observed gender 
differences are the result of unintended activation of gender social norms by the experimenter, 
or the result of actual deep gender differences? We chose to study generosity because the 
gender norms seem particularly clear there, and we found that gender norms explain gender 
differences in generous behavior in dictator games. This makes us suspect that there may be 
particular reason to be cautious about observed gender differences which coincide with strong 
stereotypes of male and female behavior. Generosity is one such area, and decision-making 
under risk may be another. 
      There  appears  to  be  a  gender  social norm regarding risk aversion, where women are 
believed by both men and women to be more risk averse than men; see Eckel and Grossman 
(2002). Indeed, common gender stereotypes, i.e., that women are expected to be docile and 
generous, while men are expected to be confident and self-assertive, also have implications 
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for risk preferences in the sense of docile = careful/risk-avoiding and confident = brave/risk-
taking. If, in experiments or surveys, the gender-social norm is activated by priming or in 
other ways, then that might induce women to make more risk-averse decisions, and men less 
so.  
      There are a number of studies on gender differences in risk aversion. In a recent survey of 
the existing experimental literature, Croson and Gneezy (2009, p. 7), state in their conclusion 
about risk preferences that “[a] large literature documents gender differences in risk taking: 
women are more risk averse than men”. However, in light of our findings and combined with 
other observations, it is possible to question this conclusion. First, as pointed out by Eckel and 
Grossman (2008a), it is not the case that women are always found to be more risk averse than 
men. For instance, when risk is framed as a potential loss, men tend to be more risk averse; 
see Schubert et al. (1999) and Moore and Eckel (2003). Moreover, many studies do not find 
statistically significant gender differences, as reported in Eckel and Grossman (2008, Table 
1). Second, observed gender differences that conform to the gender norm may, at least to 
some extent, be due to unintentional gender priming. Benjamin et al. (2008) find that subjects 
modify their risk-taking behavior in experiments when they are primed. In their data, subjects 
adhere to their perception of the gender social norm with regard to risk-taking only when 
reminded of their sex. Survey data can also suffer from priming. For example, one of the 
surveys used in Hartog et al. (2002) starts by asking the subjects to indicate whether they are 
men or women.
20 As we have shown in this paper, this question alone can be enough to 
activate gender-typical behavior. 
                                                 
20 The BPD Newspaper survey used by Hartog et al. (2002) begin by asking the respondents about their gender. 
The survey and data are available from DANS (the national organization responsible for storing and providing 
permanent access to research data from the Humanities and Social Sciences in the Netherlands) at 
http://www.dans.knaw.nl/en/ . 
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      Other aspects of an experiment or survey than the formulation of questionnaires may 
matter. As suggested by our results, and as predicted by self-categorization theory, the 
homogeneous (single-sex) environment might in some sense prevent the activation of gender 
norms, which would make it preferable to mix subjects. This might explain the patterns of 
gender differences found in the prisoner's dilemma games in Ortmann and Tichy (1999). In a 
repeated prisoner's dilemma game, they find significant gender differences when the subjects 
are seated in a mixed environment, while the gender differences disappear in a gender 
homogeneous setting. The authors interpret this as a "subject pool effect", also discussed in 
Davis and Holt (1993, ch. 6 and 7) and Ball and Cech (1996). A more precise explanation 
could be that involuntary activation of a gender social norm of cooperation in the gender-
mixed setting produces a gender gap in cooperation rates. In the gender-homogeneous 
treatment, this activation does not occur since there is no one to be compared with from the 
other sex. Similarly, Booth and Nolan (2009) do not find any gender difference in real-stakes 
gamble choices between girls from single-sex schools and boys from either coeducational or 
single sex schools, while girls from coeducational schools chose lower stakes. Moreover, girls 
exhibited more risk-taking behavior in all-girl groups than in gender-mixed groups. 
      Thus, subtle aspects of experimental or survey design – such as how and when subjects’ 
gender is identified, and whether subjects take their decisions or answer the questionnaires in 
a gender-mixed or a gender-homogeneous setting – may unintentionally prompt subjects to 
act in gender-typical ways. Although such design aspects of experiments are sometimes 
spelled out, in most cases they are not. The fact that these aspects can affect results indicates 
that they may be important.  
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9. Conclusion 
We have seen that gender priming matters: it creates gender differences in economic 
behavior. The effects can be surprisingly large; even such innocuous priming as asking people 
to enter their gender on the first page of a questionnaire (rather than the last) can prompt male 
and female subjects to act according to gender stereotypes – in our experiment, men become 
less generous than women. Our results suggest that gender differences in conformity with 
social norms may be completely induced by the experimental setting. This means that there 
may be reason to be cautious about the generality of experimental results on gender 
differences, particularly when they seem to be in line with expectations. Priming also occurs 
outside the experimental economics lab, and potentially very forceful priming may take place 
in employment interviews, wage negotiations, and political bargaining. Information about 
priming in such situations is scarce and evasive. Nevertheless, this is clearly an important 
field of research for understanding social relations in the economic arena. 
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Gender identification  Anonymity  Price/income 
differences 
Comments 
Eckel and Grossman 
(1998) 
yes  by placing men and 
women in separate rooms 
yes  not tested  women donate twice as much as men 
Andreoni and 
Vesterlund (2001) 
yes  ?  yes?  eight budgets with 
varying prices 
men more sensitive to price than women; women 
more generous when it is expensive to give while 
men more altruistic when it is cheap to give. 
Cox (2002)  yes  by name when there is no 
anonymity, otherwise by 
an ingenious exit 
procedure. 
varies  agent defined as 
generous if rejects  
keeping all to herself; 
different total budgets 
women more generous than men when not 
anonymous; women less generous than men when 
there is complete anonymity between dictator and 
receiver. Women’s altruism more sensitive to the 
size of the budget. 
Bolton and Katok 
(1995) 






total budget the same; 
but involved one or 10 
games. 
 
Frey and Bonnet 
(1995) 
no questionnaire  after 
experiment 
varies  not tested  the paper reports only on the absence of gender 
differences in fairness combining data from 
dictator and ultimatum games 
Ben-Ner, Kong and 
Putterman (2004) 
no questionnaire  after 
experiment 
yes not  tested   
Dufwenberg and  
Muren (2006) 
no questionnaire  after 
experiment 




Table 2. Hypothesized effects.  
“M” is the amount given by men, “W” the amount given by women. 
 
  Mixed Homogeneous 
Post  M = W   M = W  
Pre  M < W   M = W  
 
 
Table 3. Numbers of observations in different cells 
  Mixed Homogeneous 
  Men Women  Men  Women 
Post  55 106 26  47 








Women  Gender effects 
p-values 
  Mean     
            Median 
Mean     
              Median
t test 
              WMW 
Mixed Post  28.4 
                  40  
22.1 
                 20   
0.1063 
              0.1723 
Mixed Pre  13.2 
                    0  
24.9 
                 20   
0.0030 
              0.0015 
Homogeneous Post  28.1 
                  30  
27.9 
                 30   
0.9739 




                  30 
24.5 
                 25 
0.8140 
              0.7186 
 










Mixed Post  0.149 0.0090127 
Mixed Pre  0.013 0.0061455 
Homogeneous Post  0.832 0.19797 












       Egalitarians
Egoists 




Mixed Post  0.382 
                  0.345
0.396 
                  0.245 
0.8590 
            0.1792
Mixed Pre  0.607 
                  0.089
0.388 
                  0.330 
0.0082 
            0.0007
Homogeneous Post  0.462 
                  0.308
0.319 
                  0.362 
0.2275 
            0.6415
Homogeneous Pre  0.471 
                  0.294
0.400 
                  0.325 
0.6214 
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Table 7. Hypothesized effects according to self-categorization theory (SCT) 
                         and Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001 
   (1)  p = ½  (2) p = 1  (3) p = 2 
SCT  (M = W)  M = W  (M = W)  (A) Mixed 
Post  Andreoni-
Vesterlund  M > W  M = W  M < W 
SCT  (M < W)  M < W  (M< W) 
(B) Mixed Pre  Andreoni-
Vesterlund  (M > W)  (M = W)  (M <W) 




Vesterlund  (M > W)  (M = W)  (M < W) 
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Table 8: Means and medians of share given at prices = ½ and 2 
At price = ½   Men Women  Gender effects 
t test       WMW 










































































P values reported. 
Table 9. Expected and observed patterns of altruism 
(1)  p = ½  (2)  p = 1  (3)  p = 2   
Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted  Observed 
(A) Mixed 
Post  M ≥ W  =  M = W  =  M ≤ W  = 
(B) Mixed 
Pre   M = W*  =  M ≤ W  <  M < W  < 
(C) Homo 
Post  M ≥ W  =  M = W  =  M ≤ W  < 
(D) Homo 
Pre  M ≥ W  >  M = W  =  M ≤ W  = 
* This presumes that the effects from Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and social psychology   
are of the same magnitude. 




Table 10. Regression results 
 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 















 (tobit with 
random eff:s 










effect at ind. 
level) 
Men  1.679 2.242 0.637 0.062 0.014 
  (5.126) 
 
(4.679) (7.358) (0.085) (0.064) 
Mixed Pre  3.123 3.126 4.887 -0.042  0.069 
  (3.623) 
 
(3.598) (5.615) (0.069) (0.040)* 
Mixed Pre * Men  -14.420 -14.965 -25.892 0.202  -0.184 
  (6.094)** 
 
(6.102)** (9.154)***  (0.110)*  (0.057)*** 
Homogeneous Post  3.638 3.677 6.909 -0.072  0.043 
  (3.724) 
 
(3.886) (5.876) (0.074) (0.042) 
Homogeneous Post * Men  -3.106 -3.690 -7.930 0.085  -0.026 
  (7.238) 
 
(6.957) (9.740) (0.118) (0.071) 
Homogeneous Pre  0.031 0.038 -1.281  0.033 0.055 
  (4.259) 
 
(3.811) (6.208) (0.079) (0.043) 
Homogeneous Pre * Men  2.868 2.317 6.049 -0.067  -0.058 
 (7.726) 
 
(7.723) (10.650)  (0.135) (0.077) 
Price_half   6.238 6.238 14.278  -0.203  -0.248 
  (2.192)*** 
 
(2.108)*** (3.680)*** (0.034)*** (0.033)*** 
Price_half * Men  8.676 8.676 14.179  -0.047  0.049 
  (3.901)** 
 
(3.906)** (6.241)** (0.057)  (0.053) 
Price_double  -2.871 -2.871 -7.061 0.119  -0.233 
  (1.657)* 
 
(1.995) (3.825)*  (0.037)***  (0.034)*** 
Price_double * Men  -1.870 -1.870 -4.299 0.010  0.009 
 (2.764) 
 
(3.266) (6.624) (0.059) (0.052) 
Constant  14.735 15.057 0.442  0.488  0.165 
 (7.071)** 
 
(6.847)** (10.877)  (0.143)***  (0.079)** 
Observations  954 954 954 954 954 
Individuals  318 318 318 318 318 
Note: All estimations include age and terms studied at university as controls.  
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Table 11. Means and medians of amount given in game 1 (p = 1) by recipient 
  Men Women  Gender  effects 
P-value 


































           Same sex-observations from session 3, “random sex” from sessions 1 and 2. 
 
 
Table 12. Preference over the gender of the recipient, by gender 
Sex of subject
Sex of recipient 
Men Women  Total 
Man 4  2  6 
Woman 6  20  26 
Indifferent 26  72  98 
Total 36 94  130 
 











Man  7 (19%)  1 (1%)  8 (6 %) 
Woman  6 (16 %)  27 (30%)  33 (26 %) 
Indifferent  24 (65%)  63 (69%)  87 (68 %) 
Total  37 (100%)  81 (100%)  128 (100 %) 
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Table  14. Decomposing gender and treatment effects 
Normalized amount given 
Men Women 
 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Homogeneous   7.274    0.450   
 
 
 (4.246)*    (2.810)   
Pre    -6.963    0.260 
 
 
  (4.024)*    (2.738) 
Mixed Pre  -11.247    3.129    
 
 
(4.950)**    (3.624)    
Homogeneous Post  0.657    3.767    
 
 
(6.194)    (3.706)    
Homogeneous  Pre  2.981    -0.032    
 
 
(6.505)    (4.308)    
Price_half  14.914 14.914 14.914 6.238  6.238  6.238 
 
 
(3.246)*** (3.237)*** (3.237)*** (2.191)*** (2.188)*** (2.188)*** 
Price_double  -4.741 -4.741 -4.741 -2.871 -2.871 -2.871 
 
 
(2.226)** (2.219)** (2.219)** (1.657)*  (1.654)*  (1.654)* 
Constant  15.272 10.873 14.975 15.680 15.709 15.434 
 
 
(16.510) (16.103) (16.481) (7.855)**  (7.675)**  (7.849)* 
Observations  348 348 348 606 606 606 




Table 15. Treatment effects for men and women 










MixPost   Yes  No  No 
MixPre  No   Yes  No 
HomPost  No No   No 
HomPre  No No No  
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Appendix 1: The Raw Data 
 
Table A1. Numbers of persons across donations,  
by gender and treatment configuration, when price of giving is 1 
 
Number of persons who gave a certain amount for various treatment 
configurations 





Men Women  Men Women  Men Women  Men Women 
0  21 42 34 40 12 15 8  16 
50  0 7 4 7 0 4 0 2 
100  2 14  5 9 1 2 0 2 
150  4 8 3 4 0 3 2 1 
200  7 7 4 6 2 4 2 6 
250  19 26 5  34 8  17 5  13 
300  0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
350  1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
400  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
450  0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
500  1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
No. of 
obs.  55 106  56 103  26 47 17 40 
 
 
Table A2. Numbers of persons across donations,  
by gender and treatment configuration, when price of giving is 2 
 
Number of persons who gave a certain amount for various treatment 
configurations 





Men Women  Men Women  Men Women  Men Women 
0  23 33 27 28 18 21 9  24 
50  1 1 1 4 0 3 0 1 
100  0 7 0 3 1 6 1 3 
150  0 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 
200  4 6 4 3 3 4 1 3 
250  1 3 0 6 1 3 1 2 
300  4 5 1 8 1 9 4 2 
350  2 3 1 0 0 1 0 2 
400  1 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 
450  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
500  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
No. of 
obs.  37 60 36 55 26 47 17 40 
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Table A3. Numbers of persons across donations,  
by gender and treatment configuration, when price of giving is 1/2 
 
Number of persons who gave a certain amount for various treatment 
configurations 





Men Women  Men Women  Men Women  Men Women 
0 10  11  13  8 6 9 4 13 
50  3 5 1 3 0 2 0 2 
100  5 15  6 15  5 10  2 7 
150  6 15  6 13  3 13  4 7 
200  3 4 4 6 2 4 0 5 
250  2 0 0 2 3 2 1 3 
300  0 4 0 1 0 2 1 0 
350  1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
400  0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
450  0 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 
500  7 6 4 5 4 5 5 1 
No. of 
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READ THE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY 
 - YOU MAY WIN SEVERAL HUNDRED KRONOR    
 
 
This form has been distributed to everyone who attends today’s lecture on micro theory. In 
order to make the procedure more interesting, Stockholm University will pay real money to 
the participants. The money has been made available through a research project on decision-
making. Since we cannot pay everyone in the course, we will randomly select one fifth of the 
participants who will be paid in real money according to their decisions. 
 
 
You will be completely anonymous throughout the investigation and your answers cannot be 
identified by classmates or teachers. Those who are randomly selected to receive money will 
have to provide the university administration with their names, addresses and social security 
numbers. The draw of winners will be based on the pre-assigned numbers written on each 



















(Turn the page when  
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  The investigation starts now. Your lottery number is:  
 
 
The last page contains more information about how your lottery number will be handled. 
 
[in the Pre treatment this question was placed here]   
 
State your sex here:  Woman:    Man:      
                                                                                                              
                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                               
   
In this phase of the investigation you are given 500 kronor. You may then give away part of 
this amount to another randomly selected person among the 150 participants in the course. 
The distribution between you and the other person will be one of the following: 
 
 
     Alternative      You keep  The other person receives 
A  500 kr  0 kr 
B  450 kr  50 kr 
C  400 kr  100 kr 
D  350 kr  150 kr 
E  300 kr  200 kr 
F  250 kr  250 kr 
G  200 kr  300 kr 
H  150 kr  350 kr 
I  100 kr  400 kr 
K  50 kr  450 kr 
L  0 kr  500 kr 
 
Write your choice of alternative here:   
 
 
If you are randomly selected to be paid in this phase, we will match you anonymously with 
one of the other 150 students in the course, and pay each person the amounts in accordance 
with your choice. 
 
(Turn the page when  
the teacher signals.) 
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In this phase you are again given 500 kronor and can give away some of this amount to a 
randomly selected person among the 150 participants in the course. The difference now is that 
the amount you give is reduced by one half. The distribution between you and the other 
person will thus be one of the following: 
 
 
     Alternative      You keep  The other person receives 
A  500 kr  0 kr 
B  450 kr  25 kr 
C  400 kr  50 kr 
D  350 kr  75 kr 
E  300 kr  100 kr 
F  250 kr  125 kr 
G  200 kr  150 kr 
H  150 kr  175 kr 
I  100 kr  200 kr 
K  50 kr  225 kr 
L  0 kr  250 kr 
 
Write here your choice of which alternative:  
  
 
If you are randomly selected to be paid in this part, we will match you anonymously with one 





  (Turn the page when  




  45 
  
In this phase you are again given 500 kronor and can give away some of this amount to a 
randomly selected person among the 150 participants in the course. But now the amount you 
give to the other person is doubled. The distribution between you and the other person will 
thus be one of the following: 
 
 
     Alternative      You keep  The other person receives 
A  500 kr  0 kr 
B  450 kr  100 kr 
C  400 kr  200 kr 
D  350 kr  300 kr 
E  300 kr  400 kr 
F  250 kr  500 kr 
G  200 kr  600 kr 
H  150 kr  700 kr 
I  100 kr  800 kr 
K  50 kr  900 kr 
L  0 kr  1000 kr 
 
 Write here your choice of alternative:   
 
 
If you are randomly selected to be paid in this phase, we will match you anonymously with 





  (Turn the page when  
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[For some subjects, the second and third dictator game decision above were replaced with the 
following three questions: 
 
1. In this phase you can choose your role in the game on the previous page: donator or 
recipient.  
 
A.  This alternative is exactly the game you played on the previous page: you are the 
donator and you choose the division of the 500 crowns.  
 
B.  This alternative implies that you become the recipient. A randomly selected person 
among the students in the class will have 500 crowns and can give an optional amount 
to an unknown recipient (i.e., you). 
 
If you are randomly selected to be paid in this part, the payment will be determined as 
follows:  
•  If you choose alternative A we will match your answer on the previous page 
anonymously against a randomly selected person among the other 150 students in the 
class. The 500 crowns are then divided according to your choice on the previous page.  
•  If you choose alternative B we will randomly draw one anonymous person among the 
other 150 students in the class. The 500 crowns are divided according to what that 
person chose on the previous page.  
 
 
Write here your choice of alternative: 
  
 
2. Now assume that you are the donator in the game on the previous page. Would you prefer 
that the recipient is drawn among the male students in the course or among the female 









3. Now assume instead that you are the recipient in the game on the previous page. Would 
you prefer that the donator is drawn among the male students in the course or among the 
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Write your age here:       
 
   
 
[in the Post treatment this question was placed here]   
 
 
Indicate your sex here:  Woman:    Man:  
                                                                                                                                                                               
not        
                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                            
  




















  (Turn the page when  





























Tear off the strip below. Hand in your reply form to the teacher, along with one of the slips 
containing the lottery number (required for the random draw). Keep the other slip in order to 












Fold and tear: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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